ICONOCLAST, n. A breaker of idols, the worshipers whereof are imperfectly gratified by the performance, and most strenuously protest that he unbuildeth but doth not reedify, that he pulleth down but pileth not up. For the poor things would have other idols in place of those he thwacketh upon the mazzard and dispelleth. But the iconoclast saith: "Ye shall have none at all, for ye need them not; and if the rebuilder fooleth round hereabout, behold I will depress the head of him and sit thereon till he squawk it."
-- Ambrose Bierce

Tuesday, March 19, 2013

Anarchism is not Enough: An Anonymous Book

The most curiously integrated of the groups of stories which may be classified as a single dramatic (or philosophical) unit of the book is the queen-group. Indeed it is possible to discuss this group as if it were but one story, the episodic variations seeming no more than caprices of style—the same story told in different degrees of earnestness and so in different personalities, as it were. The one fixed personality of the group is the Queen herself; the others are all stylistic personalities. The Queen began as a photograph used by a newspaper at discreet intervals to represent the female bandit of the moment or the murder-victim or the fire-heroine or the missionary’s bride. By experience and variety she became a personality, and a fixed personality. It is quite remarkable in fact how under our very eyes this anonymous author should be able to transform a fiction into a fact: for the Queen is as true for always as the photograph is each time false. Indeed, the whole transformation is merely a matter of style. To illustrate: “As Maxine, the world’s sleeplessness champion, the photograph had great momentary importance but did not know it because it was part of a newspaper dynamic in which everything happened with equal fatalistic effect, everything was accident, in the moment succeeding accident it was always clear that nothing had happened. As photograph therefore the photograph saw all this; it was permanently unimportant but it knew this. And as it had a knowledge of its unimportance, it also had a knowledge of the importance of accident; and as the first knowledge made it insignificant so the second knowledge made it Queen. The Queen, the photograph without identity, this anonymous particularity, did in fact dwell in a world in which she was the only one and in which the world of many was only what she called ‘the chaotic conversation of events.’ So she resolved to put her queendom in order, not by interrupting the conversation, which would only have increased the chaos, but by having minutely recorded whatever ‘happened,’ whatever ‘was.’ Nothing then in her queendom contradicted anything else, neither the argument nor its answer, neither the burglar-proof lock nor the burglar against whom it was not proof: everything was so, everything was statistical, everything was falsification, everything was conversation, and she was an anonymous particularity conversing with herself about her own nothingness, so she was outside the chaotic conversation of events, she was Queen.”

Her three chief statisticians (we learn) were publishers. They were all pleasant fellows, each with a touch of the universal in him, and came and went without suspicion everywhere in the queendom because of their peoplishness: they too, like all the rest, were statistical, so statistical indeed that they were statisticians. They went about preaching the gospel of the communal ownership of events. They said: “Primitive man believed in things as events. As civilized man it is your duty to believe in events as things.” And the people did. And they permitted the statisticians (or publishers) to know what happened to them and what they did with what happened to them as faithfully as they reported their possessions each year in the great Common Book. In this queendom there was no loss and no mystery and no suffering, because everything was reported as conversation and nothing therefore thought about. All was automatic spontaneity, even their love for their Queen. As for the Queen, she would walk (we are told) through the dark rooms of her palace at night, having each room lit only upon her leaving it, until she reached her own small chamber, which remained unlit all night while the others shone; until morning, when in her own small chamber the curtains were drawn, the lamps lit, while in all the other rooms of the palace there was daylight. The meaning of this is plain: that in the anonymousness of the Queen lay her non-statistical, her non-falsificatory individuality. She is the author, the Queendom is her book. She is darkness and mystery, the plain, banal though chaotic daylight is her unravelling. By making the unravelling more methodic and so more plainly banal she separates in people the statistical from the non-statistical part, the known from the anonymous. She shows herself to be a dualist of the most dangerous kind.

For a long time the authorities from the internal evidence of the queen-stories suspected the anonymous author of being a woman. They said that it was not improbable that the book was the Bible of an underground sect devoted to educating female children to be statistical queens. But this view had to be abandoned as unscholarly, even ungentlemanly, because in nothing that the Queen said or did was there any accent of disorder or ambition: she merely, with miraculous patience and tact, saw to it that records were kept of everything. The authorities eventually concluded that she was a Character of Fiction, and so stainless, and could not help them. For some time their suspicion was fixed on a character in one of the stories with whom the Queen fell in love. But as he was Minister of Pastimes to the Queen it was thought that it might prove generally disrespectful to State officials to pursue the matter further (as when, in the story Understanding, suspicion was fixed on the character who bribed the magistrates to convict him, the inquiry was stopped by the authorities—the detectives even put on the wrong scent—as too metaphysical and cynical).

It must now be clear that the strain of my task is beginning to tell on me. I have become very nervous. In the beginning my emotions were all scholarly, my task was a pleasure, I had the manner of calmness with an antiquity. Towards the end fear has crept upon me. I must speak, and after that go on till I can go on no longer: till I am prevented. I say prevented. For I am haunted by the obsession that the authorities are still watching. They do not suspect the Queen. She was or is a fixed personality, so anonymous as to be irreproachably a Character of Fiction. The others vary in earnestness; in anonymity; they are, as I have suggested, personalities of style; they point to the probability that the author was not or is not a Character of Fiction. I dare go no further. I have become very nervous. I shall nevertheless attempt to continue my task until—I am prevented.

One of the three publishers was a Jew. He was tall, his ears oustanding, his grin long, his voice loose in his mouth. He had been financial adviser to a charitable organization and had had much general statistical though humane experience. He was gross but kind and therefore in charge of all sentimental records: his grossness assured accuracy, his kindness, delicacy.

He had the historical genius, and several specimens of his work are given—though with a touch of dryness in the author himself which makes it impossible to enjoy them as we might have were the book without an author. Indeed, they were not meant to be read at all, but merely written to satisfy the political instincts of the Queen, who never read them herself. I find it difficult to pass over them myself, for aside from their part in the book they are very interesting. There are several small extracts that might be used here with complete propriety and even in a scholarly way. And after all, the author wrote them down himself, did he not? But he was writing and not reading. But am I not writing and not reading? My position becomes more and more uncertain. I shall hurry on.

I shall give one of the Queen’s monologues, to tide us over this difficult period. The monologue does not appear in the book itself: it would have been a piece of naturalism contrary to the theory on which the book was built. Therefore I give it here, as reading. No questions must be asked of me, for as a scholar I should feel obliged to answer them; and the passage would then become writing; and I should have produced a piece of naturalism. Here then is, shall I say, a variety: which is not the anonymous author’s writing but we might almost say his reading, and after that my writing but of his reading, which remains reading for all my writing. My conscience is in your hands: the burden of curiosity and falsification falls upon you. With you rest also the rights of anonymity, the reputation of style, the fortunes of publication, the future of philosophy and scholarship and the little children, for whom these contrive sense. Sense, I say, not satire.

And now for the Queen’s monologue, which the anonymous author did not write and which for this very reason requires, as the reader’s part, sense, I say, not satire, even more immediately than what he did write. Furthermore, you will have to discover for yourself where it begins and where it ends: were I to mark it off it would become writing and so a piece of naturalism and so belie sense and give encouragement to satire. I mean: restraint, statistics, falsification, are more accurate than courage, reality, truth, and so truer. For the Queen’s monologue, since the anonymous author did not write it down, is true; had he not statistically, falsificatorily, restrained himself from writing it down it would have become a piece of naturalism and so a subject of satire. To tide us over a difficult period I set myself the difficult task of writing down the Queen’s monologue without turning it into writing, and so defying satire (if I succeed, which depends on you). The important thing is to defy satire. Satire is lying: falsity as opposed to truth and falsity as opposed to falsification. It is betwixt and between; against sense, which, whatever it is, is one thing or the other-—generally the other, it being for practical purposes impossible for it to be perpetually one thing. By practical purposes I mean of course the question of boredom, as truth finding truth is monotonous. Therefore things happen. Sense, I say, not satire. Imagine a woman has her heart broken and imagine a man breaking it, then her heart heals and he ceases to be a villain, and then they meet again and her heart is whole and he is not a villain. Does she weep because her heart was once broken and does he blush because he once broke it? This would be satire. No, they both smile, and she gives him her heart to break again, and he breaks it. This is sense. Or they both smile and turn away from each other, and this, too, is sense, but sense too academic to survive the strain of academically enforcing itself. The One Thing must be saved from itself, it must not be allowed to overwork itself or to go stale. That is why sense is one thing or the other and generally the other: falsification to relieve truth, broken hearts to protect whole hearts, weakness to spare strength. Fact is fancy and fancy is desire and desire is puff! puff! everything that satisfies it and which must be carefully recorded in spite of contradictions and lengthiness. Desire is the other things, in great number. And what is satisfaction? Not the other things, which satisfy, but the one thing, that cannot satisfy or be satisfied, and so, though but one thing, equal to desire, and so to all the other things. Fact is it not me; fact is fancy and fancy is desire and desire is the other things. Satisfaction is me, which it calls Queen. It is a lot of him’s, it is a queendom, it is desire speaking the language of satisfaction, it is a great looseness and restlessness of fact and confusion of eyesight and costume, into which the Queen brings sense through order. And what is order? Order is observation. Her first publisher (or statistician) is a gross, kind Jew. Her second is a subtle, cruel Turk, who brutally forced events: he has the political genius. But the people do not mind, since the events happen anyhow: they shrug their shoulders good-naturedly and say “Old Hassan Bey smiling with Turkish teeth,” and call on the first publisher to take notice how smilingly they wince back. Her third is a Christian, and he does nothing: he has the philosophical genius. His idleness and talkativeness exasperate the other two into efficiency. His favourite harangue is: “Let the people create their own order.”

“But how, their own order?”

“Let them think.”

“But if they think, they will all think differently, and not only differently—some will think more powerfully than others.”

“Exactly: those who think more powerfully than others will create order.”

“But this would not be real order, rather the disorder of a false order created by the most powerfully thinking individual or individuals of the moment. This would be anarchism, and anarchism is not enough!”

“I have heard that said before, but how is the order created by the Queen not anarchism?”

“The Queen does not create order, she observes methodically, she creates her order. That is why it is her queendom.”

“But is this not merely a refined form of anarchism?”

“No, it is more than anarchism. The Queen is not the chief individual of her queendom; she is the me of the it; she is the one thing, her queendom is the other things; she is satisfaction, her queendom is desire, a lot of him’s. The more me she is, the more it it is, and the more anonymous she is, and the more she and her queendom are diplomatically indistinguishable. The domestic situation is of course another affair. But to carry the distinction beyond the boundaries of the book is to fall betwixt and between, into satire.”

by Laura Riding, 1928

Monday, March 4, 2013

The Thing about Sunlight:

In Dante's inferno or Blake's deranged pit,
in a cosmical egg or à plomb chaotique,
whether one world or many doesn't mean shit.

Should you fall to the bottom, your ass gets a kick,
not slightly transformed, (did you think I meant lick?).
Not sure of your hist'ry, thrown back through the mirror,

if you trust it's a myst'ry, you needn't keep score.
If this wasn't as true as you lick off your thumb,
then where do you s'pose all that sunlight came from?
Pyrrho's Technique

By its own definition, "thing" is either and both an unnamed and indeterminate autonomosity, so therefore, is only presumed to be materially existent, unless as a stand-in or proxy for some relation or process, in which case matter is immaterial and existence incorporeal. In any language it translates to "garble". And applying to anything, once named or observed, it loses its thingness, and hence, its material objectivity – now it's glaringly subjective – for

  1. consideration on the one hand, or
  2. 'exploitation' on an other, and
  3. ignorance by any other criterion than luminosity (like stars in your eyes) or feeling (like a headache)
an affinity perchance or adventure which may lose its thing for animosity or paranoia: by association in the first which makes it relative to something else so is no longer independent; destruction in the second by virtue of its consumption or corruption (something we can't be directly assured of when even repressed skeletons emerge from dark closets); and outright disappears in the third like a closing wound or zipper – in any case it may just be a phantom, so we can with confidence proclaim "no thing exists" in dream or awake but for that we have just named or witnessed.

By any reasonable extension, nothing is unknown and all that's left is reality, a world where there's naught left to know. When all questions are obsolete the thing as such and any other self is dogma or what's read in any dictionary once one erasses all contra-dictions. Ignoring any sophistry annihilates all poetry, the chief`linguistic substance which so upset Plato, the nature of language games of which entendres or polysemy, anomolies are the`necessary conditions for any comparison, definition and assessment concerning any context, predictive predilection, and without any of which witness wanton predicates or you're placed under predation, sometimes called "into perdition".

Without some kindred for comparison, to name an unwitnessed thing eliminates all chance for consideration, use or antipathy, a thing which only authorities can offer (it's often all they have) so is taken as such, like a ding an sich as if one missed the garage door entirely, and with no ambivalence, call for property damage or a speedy ambulance. Dogma's truth is given, no questions asked, but it's no gift when every thing else is taken, most of which is room for curiosity and exploration. Doubt and fallibility or each judgment fast suspended returns the gift as an offering or suggestion and nothing gets expended. In lieu of inquests for an answer or tit-for-tat exchange, nothing can be shared except erotic poems and carnage, in either case transformed, it means it'll never be the same and even when if noticed, nothing will be missed, except perhaps the sunshine or more light on the subject though not directly in your eye.

Skepticism, ranging from a simple suspension of judgement to the outright denial of truth (although Pyrrho suggested "we neither deny nor affirm anything"), need not lead to passivity (that is literally impassive or "impressively impassable") and indifference nor to morality and the formulation of an ethics (as has been traditionally demanded by seekers of the right and true – but not the beautiful), nor to an impossible impasse, (just to double emphasize the point) although there may be no shortage of dilemma for decision-makers, meddlers and other fast-talkers equiped with intellectual ammunition in thirty round clips. A proper dialectic is just a pair of shoelaces or a set of reins: right and left make no difference to keeping your boots on while holding your horses.

ANTISYNTHESIS:
"The mode, power, might or technique of the Sceptical School is to place the phenomenal in opposition to the intellectual "in any way whatever," and thus through the equilibrium of the reasons and things opposed to each other, to reach, first the state of suspension of judgment, and afterwards that of imperturbability. We do not use the word power in any unusual sense, but simply, meaning the force of the system. By the phenomenal, we understand the sensible, hence we place the intellectual in opposition to it. The phrase "in any way whatever," may refer to the word power in order that we may understand that word in a simple sense as we said, or it may refer to the placing the phenomenal and intellectual in opposition. For we place these in opposition to each other in a variety of ways, the phenomenal to the phenomenal, and the intellectual to the intellectual, or reciprocally, and we say "in any way whatever," in order that all methods of opposition may be included. Or "in any way whatever" may refer to the phenomenal and the intellectual, so that we need not ask how does the phenomenal appear, or how are the thoughts conceived, but that we may understand these things in a simple sense. By "reasons opposed to each other," we do not by any means understand that they deny or affirm anything, but simply that they offset each other. By equilibrium, we mean equality in regard to trustworthiness and untrustworthiness, so that of the reasons that are placed in opposition to each other, one should not excel another in trustworthiness.

... The fundamental principle of the Sceptical system is especially this, namely, to oppose every argument by one of equal weight, for it seems to us that in this way we finally reach the position where we have no dogmas."
Sextus Empiricus
AGRIPPA'S OR MÜNCHHAUSEN TRILEMMA
  1. All justifications in pursuit of certain knowledge have also to justify the means of their justification and doing so they have to justify anew the means of their justification. Therefore there can be no end. We are faced with the hopeless situation of an infinite regression.
  2. One can stop at self-evidence or common sense or fundamental principles or speaking 'ex cathedra' or at any other evidence, but in doing so the intention to install certain justification is abandoned.
  3. The third horn of the trilemma is the application of a circular argument.

The agreement of slaves or antagonists, consensus leads more to dogma if not politically, democratic submission, a sacrifice or compromise. Like the Zapitistas the German assembly was a thing, but only birthed after being held up against the wall by Latin broadswords or their equivalent. Before confederation for defense from French and English conquistadors, the Iroquoian council called up nothing and stood nowhere. They were called up to help with someone facing some impending uncertainty (or so the story goes).

Before any administrative council, the thing was a festival or what happens within a circle of interest. A meet, moot or meat, the sense of which is the same, a stretch or an affair, the place for a fair. Prior to the middle ages, which is to say, in myth-time and truth was just what's trusting, the thing of aesthetic mutuality 'twas neither an economic fare nor politically fair, that certain place where justice must always proceed both from and with some jousting and never just in jest. In lieu of divinity, recipe or chance supposition, a thing is just another choice or means for a movement when confronting uncertainty. As they used to say, "bad company often makes strange bed-fellows" just prior to prescribing a strong laxative.

"We say that the Sceptic does not dogmatise. We do not say this, meaning by the word dogma the popular assent to certain things rather than others (for the Sceptic does assent to feelings that are a necessary result of sensation, as for example, when he is warm or cold, he cannot say that he thinks he is not warm or cold), but we say this, meaning by dogma the acceptance of any opinion in regard to the unknown things investigated by science. For the Pyrrhonean assents to nothing that is unknown. Furthermore, he does not dogmatise even when he utters the Sceptical formulae in regard to things that are unknown, such as "Nothing more," or "I decide nothing," or any of the others about which we shall speak later. For the one who dogmatises regards the thing about which he is said to dogmatise, as existing in itself; the Sceptic does not however regard these formulae as having an absolute existence, for he assumes that the saying "All is false," includes itself with other things as false, and likewise the saying "Nothing is true"; in the same way "Nothing more," states that together with other things it itself is nothing more, and cancels itself therefore, as well as other things. We say the same also in regard to the other Sceptical expressions. In short, if he who dogmatises, assumes as existing in itself that about which he dogmatises, the Sceptic, on the contrary, expresses his sayings in such a way that they are understood to be themselves included, and it cannot be said that he dogmatises in saying these things. The principal thing in uttering these formulae is that he says what appears to him, and communicates his own feelings in an unprejudiced way, without asserting anything in regard to external objects...

It is evident that we pay careful attention to phenomena from what we say about the criterion of the Sceptical School. The word criterion is used in two ways. First, it is understood as a proof of existence or non-existence, in regard to which we shall speak in the opposing argument. Secondly, when it refers to action, meaning the criterion to which we give heed in life, in doing some things and refraining from doing others, and it is about this that we shall now speak. We say, consequently, that the criterion of the Sceptical School is the phenomenon, and in calling it so, we mean the idea of it. It cannot be doubted, as it is based upon susceptibility and involuntary feeling. Hence no one doubts, perhaps, that an object appears so and so, but one questions if it is as it appears. Therefore, as we cannot be entirely inactive as regards the observances of daily life, we live by giving heed to phenomena, and in an unprejudiced way. But this observance of what pertains to the daily life, appears to be of four different kinds. Sometimes it is directed by the guidance of nature, sometimes by the necessity of the feelings, sometimes by the tradition of laws and of customs, and sometimes by the teaching of the arts. It is directed by the guidance of nature, for by nature we are capable of sensation and thought; by the necessity of the feelings, for hunger leads us to food, and thirst to drink; by the traditions of laws and customs, for according to them we consider piety a good in daily life, and impiety an evil; by the teaching of the arts, for we are not inactive in the arts we undertake. We say all these things, however, without expressing a decided opinion." (ibid)

But a virtue itself, particularly one of submission (piety) or aloofness (disinterest), is incompatible with every-day life taken together with any other pro- or im-posed value: there is an impiousness lurking 'neath the lines of every skeptic wishing a voice without being cast into the pit undone or too early. Virtue is only true of and in itself or when in the isolation of solitary confinement, which is to say out of space or context, emulated or enframed, in-flamed and therefore false or dying, but without the insinuation of lying and that is sometimes called hypocrisy or else delusion. It may just be outside of myth-time, everything's absurd or cast with self-allusion – a thing witnessed shining on every regime may be as certain as any sunburn on a cloudless day or gamma rays when shady so to wish to further cloud things up would be by all a thing of virtuous desire often, traveling underneath the name of mayhem.

"One cannot but recall here a witty formula of life under a hard Communist regime: Of the three features—personal honesty, sincere support of the regime and intelligence—it was possible to combine only two, never all three. If one was honest and supportive, one was not very bright; if one was bright and supportive, one was not honest; if one was honest and bright, one was not supportive."
Žižek

What is thought to be a dilemma concerning reality is no such thing should you follow Einstein's advice and enlarge your circle of interest or compassion to let things fall where they may but not refrain from taking action or speaking things relatedly. Such as was in myth-time is now mislabeled ancestor worship, the same folks who say "If it was good enough for grandpa then it's good enough for me.

To wit: Consider a child is in the street and comes along a bus. Either may be your own but the juxtaposition presents three alternatives.

  1. The first, if you're a human and you don't drop dead in shock, is your heart clogs up your throat and your gut falls down an elevator shaft and you're there (the "mother panic maneuver"), and just in time at that.
  2. On the other hand your grasp comes up empty – the child was just an optical illusion – and pausing in momentary dismay, the bus grinds your new haircut out from the pothole and into the asphalt.
  3. The weighty analysis. Should you have prior stopped to consider more carefully the options and the situation and then proceed with more certainty or do nothing, walk without a care and guarantee your safety or prevent the accusation you've been once again in error?
The smart thing would be to have abstained from all demands that say that you should cut your hair and hope for the best because if it's not one thing, it'll always be t'other. Burying your feelings on any matter never meant, except by chance, you'll come out any other end unscathed or less demented like reversing the transmission back across the railroad tracks to re-align your front suspension. But just in case, so said Pascal, all lacking in a certainty, you give it a shot, and that's experimentalism, believe it or not. On clear days even juries cast the shadows of a doubt.